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1 Introduction
Responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism shifts the focus from outcomes to their determi-
nants, when assessing economic inequalities, and advocates offsetting the effect of circum-
stances, for which individuals are not deemed responsible, while respecting the effects of
effort. Since the first contributions by Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989), and Cohen (1990),
the economics literature, following seminar contributions by (Roemer, 1993, 1998), Fleur-
baey (1995) and Bossert (1995), has laid out the basic principles that ought to guide
measurement. In a recent paper (Ramos and Van de gaer, 2016), we bring together the
theoretical and the empirical literature and draw attention to the conceptual differences
of the empirical measures. This paper takes those lessons as starting point with the in-
tention to investigate whether those important conceptual differences have any bearing in
ordering distributions when taken to the data, and bring about systematic differences in
orderings. To this end, we estimate a wide range of inequality of opportunity measures to
the same set of data, the European Union - Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC), an empirical exercise which has not been done so far.
Conceptually, the most frequently used measures of inequality of opportunity can be
classified on the basis of three criteria. The first criterion, distinguishes between ex-ante
and ex-post measures. Ex-ante measures compute the inequality in the values of indi-
viduals’ opportunity sets while ex-post measures compute the inequality in the incomes
of those that have the same efforts. Initially, the theoretical literature treated ex-ante
and ex-post approaches approaches as being very similar (Roemer, 2002, Roemer et al.,
2003). Recent theoretical contributions stress they are different and often conflict (Ooghe
et al., 2007, Roemer, 2012 and Fleurbaey and Peragine, 2013). Most of the empirical
litterature continues to treat them as interchangeable, by motivating their concern with
inequality of opportunity from ex-post intuitions and using ex-ante measures of inequality
of opportunity. We find that the distiction between ex-ante versus ex-post matters a lot
for country orderings. The second criterion, due to Pistolesi (2009), distinguishes between
direct and indirect measures. Direct measures calculate the inequality in a counterfac-
tual income distribution where all income inequalities are exclusively due to individuals’
circumstances. Indirect measures calculate the difference between the inequality in the
actual income distribution and the inequality in a counterfactual income distribution in
which there is no inequality of opportunity. Our results suggest that the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect measures is of secondary importance: conditional on the ex-ante
or ex-post apporoach, direct measures are quite different from indirect measures. The
third criterion focuses on whether a parametric or non-parametric methodology is used
to construct the counterfactual. This choice is relevant when the often-used parsimonious
linear specification does not yield a reasonable fit, and it is thus data-dependent.
In the next Section we provide a more detailed description of these criteria, present
and formally define the most frequently used measures of inequality of opportunity and
classify them. Section 3 describes the EU-SILC data and the circumstances and effort
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variables used in the empirical analysis, while Section 4 reports our main results. We
first examine the incidence of choices on country orderings, and then show estimates from
growth regressions to illustrate further their empirical relevance. The concluding section
wraps up.
2 Measurement Approaches
As responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism distinguishes between efforts and circumstances,
the empirical model assumes that for each individual k in the population N = {1, · · · , n},
his income, yk, depends on his circumstances, given by a d
C-dimensional vector aCk , his
efforts, given by a dR-dimensional vector aRk , and a random term ek, such that
yk = g
(
aCk , a
R
k , ek
)
where g : Rd
C × RdR × R→ R++.1
Following Roemer (1993) (Peragine, 2004) a type (tranche) is a set of people having the
same circumstances (efforts). Measures of inequality of opportuity can be classified on the
basis of three criteria: whether they take an ex-ante or ex-post perspective, whether they
are direct or indirect measures of inequality of opportunity, and whether the counterfactual
distribution used in the measure is constructed using a parametric or non-parametric
method.
A first distinction is between ex-ante and ex-post approaches. The ex-ante approach
measures the inequality between individuals’ opportunity sets, and assumes that these
opportunity sets are determined by individuals’ circumstances. It attaches the same value
to the opportunity set of those that belong to the same type, and measures the inequality in
the values of individuals’ opportunity sets. The ex-post approach measures the inequality
in the incomes of individuals that have the same effort. All inequalities between such
individuals must be due to their circumstances, and is, for that reason a measure of
inequality of opportunity.2
A second distinction is between direct and indirect measures. Direct measures of
inequality of opportunity compute the inequality in a n-dimensional counterfactual income
distribution yc in which all inequalities due to differences in effort have been eliminated
such that only the inequality that is due to differences in circumstances is left:
I (yc) , (1)
where I : Rn++ → R is a measure of inequality. Indirect measures of inequality of opportu-
nity compare the inequality in the actual distribution of income, I (y), to the inequality in
1We discussed the consequences of unobserved random variation in Ramos and Van de gaer (2016), and
abstract from that complication here.
2In parametric ex-post approaches the random term is put equal to zero in the construction of the
counterfactual, such that variation in the counterfactual is due to differences in efforts. In non-parametric
approaches random terms are not taken into account, but the averaging procedures make them disappear,
at least asymptotically.
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a counterfactual income distribution where there is no inequality of opportunity I
(
yE0
)
.
This results in the measure
ΘI
(
y, yEO
)
= I (y)− I (yEO) , (2)
where ΘI
(
y, yEO
)
: Rn++×Rn++ → R. Based on a decomposition argument, the idea behind
the appraoch is that the difference beween the inequality in the actual distribution and
the inequality in the counterfactual income distribution without inequality of opportunity
gives the inequality that is due to inequality of opportunity.
A third distinction is based on the method used to construct the counterfactual. This
method can be parametric or non-parametric. The parametric approach imposes a func-
tional form to estimate individuals’ incomes as a function of efforts or circumstances,
resulting in specifications with 3 possible domains:
ĝ
(
aCk , a
R
k , ek
)
where ĝ : Rd
C × RdR × R→ R++,
ĝC
(
aCk , ek
)
where ĝC : Rd
C × R→ R++,
ĝR
(
aRk , ek
)
where ĝR : Rd
R × R→ R++.
These equations can be used to estimate yk by setting ek equal to zero. Non-parametric
procedures typically do not impose a functional form and rely on averaging procedures.
Table 1 uses the three distinctions to classify the standard measures used in the liter-
ature.
Table 1: Measures of inequality of opportunity
Non-parametric Parametric
(a) Direct I (yc)
Ex-ante yc1k =
1
|Nk.|
∑
i∈Nk. yi y
c3
k = ĝ
C
(
aCk , 0
)
yc2k =
2
|Nk.||Nk.+1|
∑
i∈Nk. iy˜i
Ex-post yc4k = yk
µ(y)
yEO1k
yc5k
(
aR
)
= ĝ
(
aCk , a
R, 0
)
(b) Indirect ΘI
(
y, yEO
)
= I (y)− I (yEO)
Ex-ante yEO4k = yk
µ(y)
yc1k
Ex-post yEO1k =
1
|N.k|
∑
i∈N.k yi y
EO3
k = ĝ
R
(
aRk , 0
)
yEO2k =
2
|N.k||N.k+1|
∑
i∈N.k iyˇi y
EO5
k
(
aC
)
= ĝ
(
aC , aRk , 0
)
Notes: Nk. =
{
i ∈ N | aCi = aCk
}
, y˜i is the i−th largest level of income in
the set Nk., a
R is a reference value for the vector of responsibility variables,
N.k =
{
i ∈ N | aRi = aRk
}
, yˇi is the i−th largest level of income in the set
N.k, a
C is a reference value for the vector of circumstance variables, µ (y) is
mean income of vector y.
Consider the direct measures first. Three ways to measure the value of an individ-
ual’s opportunity set are proposed. Counterfactual yc1, proposed by Van de gaer (1993),
measures the value of an individual’s opportunity set by the average income of his type;
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yc2, proposed by Lefranc et al. (2008) measures it by the normalized surface under the
generalised Lorenz curve of his type; yc3, proposed by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) takes
the parametric estimate of his income, given his circumstances. The counterfactual for
ex-post measure yc4, proposed by Checchi and Peragine (2010), scales everybody’s income
up or down by the ratio of the average income in the population and the average income
of his tranche. That way, the inequalities between those that belong to the same tranche
are preserved, while the differences in average incomes of different tranches are eliminated.
Finally, yc5, proposed by Pistolesi (2009), relies on the choice of aR, a reference value for
the vector of responsibility characteristics and takes the parametric estimate of his income,
given his circumstances and efforts equal to the reference values.
The counterfactuals used in the indirect approach are obtained by switching the role of
circumstance and effort variables of the direct approach. This dual relationship is reflected
in the number used to label the counterfactuals: for all i = 1, · · · , 5, yEOi is the dual
counterfactual of yci. Checchi and Peragine (2010) proposed counterfactual yEO1, which
assigns to every individual the average income of his tranche; yEO2 assigns the value of the
normalized surface under the generalised Lorenz curve of the income distribution of his
tranche; yEO3 the parametric estimate of his income, given his efforts; yEO5 the parametric
estimate of his income, given his efforts and circumstances equal to the reference values. In
all these counterfactuals, those with the same efforts have the same income, such that the
corresponding indirect measure becomes a measure of the income inequality that is due to
their different circumstance; they are ex-post measures of inequality of opportunity. The
only ex-ante measure is yEO4, proposed by Checchi and Peragine (2010), where incomes
are scaled up or down by the ratio of the average income in the population and the value of
the opportunity set measured by yc1k , such that in this counterfactual, the average income
of every type equals average income in the population and everyone’s opportunity set has
the same value. In the sequel IX denotes the inequality measure based on counterfactual
yX with X ∈ {c1, . . . , c5, EO1, . . . , EO5}.
3 Data
We draw on data from the European Union - Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC), which collects comparable information on socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of individuals across European countries. In particular we use the 2005
and 2011 waves, which collected information on family background and circumstances
when the respondent was young in separate questionnaire modules. EU-SILC data have
been commonly used to study equality of opportunity across European countries, see inter
alia Marrero and Rodr´ıguez (2012) and Checchi et al. (2016).
The EU-SILC provides data for a large number of countries, which allows us to compare
country orderings by inequality of opportunity when different measures are used. The main
limitation of EU-SILC is the reduced sample sizes for some countries, which obliges us to
work with a reduced number of circumstances and efforts.
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As in previous studies, e.g. Marrero and Rodr´ıguez (2012), we select individuals aged
25 to 59 to avoid the noise associated to the school-job transition for the younger popula-
tion and to retirement decisions for the older individuals.
Our outcome of interest is disposable equivalent income.3 To check the reliability of our
income variable, we compare our income inequality estimates with other estimates coming
from different sources, such as the OECD, and obtain correlation coefficients above 0.9,
indicating that our estimates are in line with those from the OECD.
Working with a limited amount of circumstances and effort variables, and thus types
and tranches, results in partitions that are too coarse and that end up driving the estimates
of the various direct and indirect measures. Because of this, we use a set of 5 circumstance
and 4 effort variables, which translate into 48 types and 24 tranches, thus achieving finer
partitions than the majority of recent empirical studies on equality of opportunity. Our
circumstances include parental education and occupation, gender, birthplace, and whether
the respondent lived with both parents when young, while the set of efforts includes own
educational attainment, own occupation, work status, and marital status. All variables
have two categories, except the two occupation variables, which have 3 categories each.
Description and summary statistics of circumstance and effort variables can be found in
Appendix Tables 10 to 13.
The circumstance variable “whether both parents were present at home when respon-
dent was young” has not been used before, and thus deserve some justification. Growing
up in non-intact families is found to condition several later-life outcomes, and earnings
during adulthood is one of them (Mohanty and Ullah, 2012).
Own education has been previously used as effort variable (e.g. Alm˚as et al., 2011),
but we believe deserves some discussion. Undoubtedly own effort affects educational at-
tainment (De Fraja et al., 2010), which in turn determines wages and thus incomes. What
may be a bit more controversial is the choice of own education as an effort variable, as
some may argue that children cannot be deemed responsible for their own effort before
the age of consent, and such effort levels are also determining later educational attainment
after the age of consent. As discussed above, however, since there are only few variables
in the EU-SILC that can be used as effort variables and most of them provide only very
small cell sizes, we decided to use own educational attainment as an effort variable.
The other variables included in the set of circumstances or effort are not new and
rather uncontroversial, and do not deserve further discussion.4
3Disposal equivalent individual income is computed by deflating disposal equivalent household income
(variable HY020, including the sum for all household members of gross personal income components plus
gross income components at household level, minus taxes paid), with the modified OECD equivalent scale,
(variable HX050, which assigns a weight of 1 to the first adult, of 0.5 to remaining adults of the family,
and of 0.3 to children younger than 14).
4See Table 25.8 in Ferreira and Peragine (2016) for a list of circumstance variables used in eight papers
that cover 41 countries. Roemer and Trannoy (2015) discuss important issues in the use of effort variables
often included in empirical analyses.
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4 Results
This section presents the results of testing whether the main conceptual issues discussed in
Section 2 matter in practice. To this end, we first estimate inequality of opportunity for all
counterfactual distributions yc1 to yc5 and yEO1 to yEO5, and then check whether different
measures of inequality of opportunity change the ordering of inequality of opportunity
across countries by means of Spearman’s rank correlations. When they do, we analyze
whether the conceptual issues shape these ordering changes.
Empirical studies mostly use two well known inequality indices to compute inequality
of opportunity: the MLD and the Gini coefficient. As we discuss below, both indices have
advantages and drawbacks for the measurement of inequality of opportunity. We employ
the Gini coefficient in our baseline estimates reported below, and present the robustness
of our findings to using the MLD in Section 4.1. In this section we refer to and present
results for 2005. Our findings also hold to a very large extent for 2011, and when they
differ we indicate it in the text. The evidence for 2011 is shown in the Appendix Tables
6 to 8.5
Rank correlation coefficients displayed in Table 2 are for some measures surprisingly
low and sometimes not significantly different from zero. This raises doubts that all these
measures capture the same concept. Looking at the Table in more detail, it becomes clear
that some conceptual and theoretical differences outlined in Section 2 matter in practice.
The clearest lesson is that ex-ante and ex-post views lead to different country orderings.
The rank correlations between ex-ante and ex-post measures are often not significantly
different from zero. The distinction between direct and indirect approaches matters only
conditional on choosing an ex-ante or an ex-post view. Next we discuss this in more
detail and examine the empirical importance of other relevant issues that the analyst
must address when estimating inequality of opportunity.
If we were to group the measures discussed in Section 2 according to the corre-
lations displayed in Table 2, we would have three groups: G1 = (y
c1, yc2, yc3, yEO4),
G2 = (y
c4, yEO1, yEO2, yEO3, yEO5), and G3 = (y
c5). G1 includes all ex-ante measures,
while G2 includes all ex-post measures but y
c5, which seems to yield different orderings
than all other measures, so we put it separately into G3. Thus, the difference between
ex-ante and ex-post measures comes out as an important empirical divide.6
The direct and indirect approaches do not seem to shape the estimated rank cor-
relations as much as the ex-ante/ex-post divide. While rank correlations amongst direct
measures are reasonably high (> .69), direct ex-ante measures yc1, yc2, and yc3 show higher
correlations with the indirect ex-ante measure yEO4 than with direct ex-post measures yc4
and yc5. Indirect measures show a similar pattern, as the indirect ex-ante measure yEO4
shows a higher correlation with direct ex-ante measures than with indirect ex-post mea-
5Our results are also robust to dropping Cyprus from the analysis, as it showed an unreasonable increase
in income inequality, according both to the Gini (> 20% increase from 2005 to 2011) and to the MLD
(> 45% increase).
6For 2011, yc3 correlates most strongly with yc5, and so should be included in group G3.
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sures yEO1, yEO2, yEO3, yEO5. Likewise, excluding yc5, indirect ex-post measures show
higher correlations with direct ex-post measures than with indirect ex-ante measures. That
is, conditional on the ex-ante or ex-post approach, measures yield closer rankings within
direct and within indirect methods than across them.
We turn next to the third distinction between measures based on parametric and non-
parametric counterfactuals. Non-parametric counterfactuals are equivalent to those ob-
tained from fully saturated parametric models that include all possible interaction effects.
Most of the literature, however, uses linear specifications for the parametric approach.
In the light of this, the relevant question is: To what extent does the importance of in-
teraction effects differ enough across countries as to change the country orderings? Our
findings suggest that the answer is data-dependent. In fairly parsimonious specifications
that provide a reasonable fit, interaction effects are not so relevant in determining country
orderings, as non-parametric and analogous or similar linear parametric approaches yield
similar orderings. For instance, Table 2 shows that the rank correlation between ex-ante
direct non-parametric yc1 and linear parametric yc3 is 0.89, while the rank correlation
between indirect ex-post non parametric yEO1 and its parametric counterpart yEO3 is
also large (0.92). However, when the fit of the parsimonious specification is rather poor,
interaction effects are indeed relevant in determining country orderings. The fit of our
linear regressions for 2011 is much poorer than the fit for 2005. As a consequence, the
rank correlation between ex-ante direct non-parametric yc1 and linear parametric yc3 is
remarkably low, 0.18 –see Table 6.7 Our 2011 findings are in line with Brunori et al.
(2016). They use the same EU-SILC dataset for 2011 to compare a parsimonious linear
specification with another specification that includes all possible interaction terms and
where categorical variables are partitioned more finely, and obtain a rank correlation of
0.52 between direct measures yc1 and yc3.
As we explained above, parametric approaches estimate counterfactuals in two ways:
either by using ĝC (ĝR) in the direct (indirect) approach i.e. including in the regression
only the set of circumstances (efforts), or by using the functional form (ĝ), i.e. including
both circumstances and efforts in the specification. The latter allows for a more flexible
treatment of the correlation between circumstances and efforts and is thus likely to yield
different parameter estimates and counterfactual distributions. The best comparison to see
whether and to what extent including both circumstances and efforts matter empirically
is provided by measures yEO3 and yEO5, as they are both indirect and ex-post. The large
correlation (0.95) displayed in Table 2 suggests that conditioning on circumstances in the
indirect approach does not lead to substantially different country orderings. In contrast,
the somewhat lower correlation between measures yc3 and yc5 (0.81) may suggest that
taking efforts into account in the direct approach is relevant. This conclusion, however,
must be taken with caution as yc3 is ex-ante while yc5 is ex-post, and this difference may
7In the indirect approach, poor regression fits result in measurements of inequality of opportunity being
very similar to measurements of inequality of outcome. This explains why the rank correlation between
indirect ex-post non parametric yEO1 and its parametric counterpart yEO3 is large in 2011, 0.97.
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also be behind the lower correlation.
Dual counterfactuals provide a somewhat natural way of making conceptual analogies
between views and approaches. The data reveal that they lead to country orderings that
are quite different –rank correlation coefficients amongst dual counterfactuals range from
0.11 to 0.41. Moreover, in our grouping of measures on the basis of their correlation, it
never happens that dual counterfactuals belong to the same group.
Finally we examine whether it matters allowing for inequality aversion with respect to
income differences due to differences in effort. We compare the non-parametric measures,
yc1 and yc2 for the direct approach, and yEO1 and yEO2 for the indirect approach. The
results in Table 2 show that allowing for inequality aversion does not matter neither for
the direct nor for the indirect measures, as rank correlations are larger than 0.93.
Table 2: Rank correlations between inequality of opportunity measures. Gini
coefficient, 2005.
Direct measures Indirect Measures
EA EP EA
yc1 yc2 yc3 yc4 yc5 yEO1 yEO2 yEO3 yEO4
yc2 0.968
0.000
yc3 0.894 0.916
0.000 0.000
yc4 0.729 0.740 0.702
0.000 0.000 0.000
yc5 0.759 0.829 0.814 0.685
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
yEO1 0.412 0.389 0.279 0.794 0.414
0.037 0.050 0.168 0.000 0.036
yEO2 0.232 0.225 0.159 0.733 0.299 0.928
0.256 0.257 0.438 0.000 0.138 0.000
yEO3 0.221 0.186 0.110 0.647 0.196 0.915 0.932
0.278 0.364 0.594 0.000 0.338 0.000 0.000
yEO4 0.964 0.931 0.841 0.639 0.695 0.321 0.174 0.167
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.395 0.416
yEO5 0.394 0.368 0.287 0.740 0.346 0.917 0.901 0.952 0.347
0.046 0.065 0.155 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.082
Notes: Rank correlations are shown in the upper row, while p-values are shown in
the lower row. EA means Ex-ante, EP means Ex-post.
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4.1 Robustness to using the MLD instead of the Gini
The high cross index correlations of Table 5 show that using the Gini coefficient or the MLD
does not matter much for our country orderings. Table 4 shows that our findings about the
correlations between the different measures also hold for the MLD index. It is striking,
however, that the correlations between ex-ante and ex-post measures are substantially
higher for the MLD than for the Gini.8 Due to its path independence property (Foster
and Sneyerov, 2000), yc1 and yEO4, as well as yEO1 and yc4 yield exactly the same ordering
when using the MLD. The other indirect counterfactuals give a distribution in which all
inequality is due to differences in efforts, and, a decomposition argument can be used to
say that the difference in inequality in the actual distribution and the inequality that is due
to efforts equals the inequality that is due to circumstances, which is what direct measures
capture. Our finding that the rank correlations between ex-ante and ex-post measures are
larger for the MLD than for the Gini confirms that the decomposition argument makes
more sense for the MLD than for the Gini coefficient.
4.2 Inequality of Opportunity and Economic Growth
To illustrate further the empirical relevance of the different conceptual choices, this sec-
tion explores the relationship between inequality of opportunity and economic growth,
which has captured the attention of the recent literature. It is important to note that
given the many limitations that the EU-SILC imposes, this empirical exercise is solely
illustrative. As outlined in Section 3, the EU-SILC collects data on family background
and circumstances when the respondent was young at two points in time, 2005 and 2011.
This means that we can only estimate inequality of opportunity for these two years. This
data structure imposes two major limitations on our empirical exercise: First, our time
series is very short, as we can only exploit variability at two points in time, and second,
we can only study growth over a time period which is much shorter than the 5 or 10 year
period, which is customary.
Recent literature has explored the idea that inequality due to efforts and inequality
due to circumstances (inequality of opportunity) have opposite effects on economic growth,
which in turn may help explain the inconclusive evidence of the effects of overall inequality
on economic growth (see among others Marrero and Rodr´ıguez, 2013 and Ferreira et al.,
2014). While inequality of opportunity is argued to have a deleterious impact on economic
growth, effort inequality is deemed to have an enhancing impact on growth. The empirical
papers that test this hypothesis usually use only one of the many options outlined in
Section 2 to estimate inequality of opportunity. However, as we have reported above,
different opportunity inequality measures give rise to different country orderings. Do the
findings reported in the literature crucially hinge on the specific inequality of opportunity
measure used? To answer this question, this section runs growth regressions and checks
8The same is true for the correlation between yEO4 and the other indirect measures, but remember that
the former produces rankings that are more similar to the ones produced by ex-ante measures.
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whether results are robust to the way inequality of opportunity and inequality of effort
are measured.
Following Forbes (2000), we estimate the following panel regression
gc,(t,t−s) = β1IOc,t−s + β2IEc,t−s + β3GDPc,t−s + β4Edc,t−s + β5Invc,t−s + αc + τt + ct
where gct is the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP between t and t − s,
IOc,t−s is one of the inequality of opportunity measures outlined in Section 2, IEc,t−s is
residual inequality, often assumed to be inequality of effort, and computed as the difference
between outcome and opportunity inequality, GDPc,t−s is the Gross Domestic Product,
Edc,t−s is the population share with upper secondary education or above, Invc,t−s is the
business investment to GDP ratio, and αc and τt capture country and time specific fixed
effects. Control variables, namely GDP, education shares, and investment, come from
Euorstat, and all regressors refer to the initial period over which growth is estimated to
avoid simultaneity issues.
We estimate the model by fixed effects, which control for time-invariant omitted vari-
ables. It is a demanding estimation strategy, as we are identifying effects using within-
country variation with only two time points, but nonetheless still suffers from endogeneity
problems (Bond, 2002). Given the difficulty to find external instruments, system-GMM
methods are usually employed to address such endogeneity issues (Bond et al., 2001).
These models, however, require three time points, while we only have two, which precludes
us from taking due account of the possible endogeneity bias. If we however assume that
the possible bias does not change across different measures of inequality of opportunity,
it should not invalidate our comparative results, which is what we are mainly concerned
with in this empirical exercise.
Table 3 reports the fixed effects estimates of outcome inequality and of the two variables
of interest, IOc,t−s and IEc,t−s for one to three year average annual growth rates and the
ten measures of inequality of opportunity, measured with the Gini coefficient. Outcome
inequality regressions simply replace the two inequality of opportunity and effort measures
in the specification above with a measure of outcome inequality. We find non-significant
effects of outcome inequality on growth, regardless of whether the latter is measured over
one, two or three years.
Inequality of Opportunity is only significant at the standard 5% level with the expected
negative sign when the measure yc5 is used for one- and two-year growth rates. The
measure yc3 is also negative and significant at 10% but only for three-year growth rates,
while inequality of effort is systematically not significant. Appendix Table 9 shows that
when the MLD is used to measure inequality in the counterfactual distributions inequality
of opportunity shows no significant effect on growth.9
Given the difficulty of identifying precise effects using within-country variation with
9As it happens with the correlation between different measures, our growth results are also robust to
dropping Cyprus from the analysis, as it showed an unreasonable increase in income inequality, according
both to the Gini (> 20% increase from 2005 to 2011) and to the MLD (> 45% increase).
11
only two time points, we next abstract from the precision of the point estimates, and
examine how the conceptual divides relate to the following two hypotheses about the
effects of opportunity and effort inequality.
Strong hypothesis (SH): The effect of inequality of opportunity is negative while the effect
of effort inequality is positive (i.e. β1 < 0 and β2 > 0).
Weak hypothesis (WH): The effect of inequality of opportunity is more negative than the
effect of effort inequality (i.e. 0 > β1 < β2).
The estimates reported in Table 3 show that, ignoring issues of statistical significance,
SH occurs only twice (for one-year growth), each time for ex ante measures. For indirect
measures it never happens that the two effects have opposite signs. Direct measures
are always in line with WH, except for yc4 with 3-period growth. However, for indirect
measures, this is the case in only 5 instances out of 15.10 All and all, this evidence may
be seen as a (admittedly) weak argument in support of the direct approach.
In sum, this empirical exercise illustrates that the effect of inequality of opportunity
(and effort) on growth is not robust to the measure of inequality of opportunity employed.
These findings cast doubt on existing evidence, which is exclusively based on the ex-ante
parametric measure yc3, and highlights the importance of different measurement choices.
We hope we provide grounds for the still incipient empirical literature that explores the
effects of equality of opportunity on growth to check the sensibility of its findings to
different choices.
10When we use the MLD as inequality index, our findings are also consistent with SH for ex ante (direct)
measures. However, both direct and indirect measures are consistent with WH in about two thirds of the
cases –Table 9 in the Appendix shows the coefficient estimates.
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Table 3: Growth regressions. Fixed effect estimates of Outcome, Opportunity and Effort Inequality. Inequality measured with the Gini
coefficient.
Period Inequality Direct Approach
y yc1 yc2 yc3 yc4 yc5
β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value
(t, t-1) Outcome -0.240 0.353
Opportunity -0.354 0.289 -0.335 0.340 -0.591 0.128 -0.280 0.332 -1.494** 0.016
Effort -0.152 0.289 -0.190 0.514 0.001 0.998 -0.115 0.789 0.082 0.752
(t, t-2) Outcome -0.275 0.250
Opportunity -0.440 0.151 -0.397 0.220 -0.584 0.104 -0.305 0.253 -1.248** 0.033
Effort -0.147 0.595 -0.210 0.430 -0.063 0.829 -0.181 0.650 -0.025 0.921
(t, t-3) Outcome -0.340 0.157
Opportunity -0.462 0.134 -0.406 0.210 -0.639* 0.076 -0.332 0.212 -1.098* 0.065
Effort -0.244 0.382 -0.304 0.259 -0.134 0.645 -0.362 0.365 -0.144 0.583
Indirect Approach
yEO1 yEO2 yEO3 yEO4 yEO5
β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value
(t, t-1) Opportunity -0.219 0.482 -0.210 0.495 -0.219 0.476 -0.175 0.888 -0.178 0.576
Effort -0.242 0.365 -0.245 0.360 -0.243 0.364 -0.247 0.402 -0.246 0.357
(t, t-2) Opportunity -0.271 0.347 -0.269 0.334 -0.270 0.344 -0.628 0.583 -0.234 0.426
Effort -0.276 0.265 -0.276 0.266 -0.276 0.265 -0.239 0.376 -0.279 0.259
(t, t-3) Opportunity -0.303 0.290 -0.318 0.263 -0.314 0.268 -0.634 0.577 -0.282 0.335
Effort -0.342 0.167 -0.343 0.168 -0.343 0.167 -0.309 0.253 -0.344 0.164
N 49 49 49 49 49 49
Notes: All regressions include GDP, population share with upper-secondary school or above, and ratio of business investment to GDP, all measured
at the beginning of the period, plus a time dummy. * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<0.05.
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5 Conclusion
Several choices guide the measurement of equality of opportunity. We use EU-SILC data
for many European countries to examine whether those choices matter empirically. To
this end, we perform two empirical exercises: First we check whether measures that share
the same conceptual choices yield similar inequality of opportunity country orderings, and
then we analyse whether they yield similar estimates in growth regressions.
Our findings on country orderings identify one crucially important divide, between
ex-ante and ex-post views, as it leads to different country orderings. The distinction
between direct and indirect approaches matters only conditional on choosing an ex-ante
or an ex-post view. Recent theoretical contributions have shown that ex-ante and ex-
post approaches to inequality of opportunity are incompatible. Our paper shows that the
distinction also matters empirically. As the evaluation of inequality of opportunity is in
essence a normative exercise, our results show that researchers should be explicit about the
normative choice made between an ex-ante or ex-post criterion. From growth regressions
we conclude that the particular measure of inequality of opportunity employed conditions
the effect that inequality of opportunity (and inequality due to effort) has on growth. We
find that the direct parametric ex-ante measures correlate more in the expected way with
economic growth than the others. As the question whether inequality of opportunity has
an effect on economic growth is a positive exercise, our results could suggest that it is
ex-ante inequality of opportunity (i.e. inequality between opportunity sets) rather than
ex-post inequality of opportunity that is detrimental for growth.
Hence we have to recognize that inequality of opportunity is a multifaced concept.
Consequently, scholars should provide arguments to support the conceptual choices em-
bedded in the measures they use. Particular attention should be paid to taking and ex-ante
or an ex-post view.
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A Appendix
Table 4: Rank correlations between inequality of opportunity measures. Mean
Log Deviation, 2005.
Direct measures Indirect Measures
EA EP EA
yc1 yc2 yc3 yc4 yc5 yEO1 yEO2 yEO3 yEO4
yc2 0.942
0.000
yc3 0.895 0.946
0.000 0.000
yc4 0.730 0.722 0.744
0.000 0.000 0.000
yc5 0.737 0.797 0.841 0.621
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
yEO1 0.730 0.722 0.744 1.000 0.621
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
yEO2 0.730 0.708 0.722 0.987 0.584 0.987
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
yEO3 0.733 0.717 0.744 0.997 0.612 0.997 0.986
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
yEO4 1.000 0.942 0.895 0.730 0.737 0.730 0.730 0.733
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
yEO5 0.761 0.745 0.760 0.992 0.625 0.992 0.986 0.995 0.761
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Rank correlations are shown in the upper row, while p-values are shown in
the lower row. EA means Ex-ante, EP means Ex-post.
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Table 5: Rank correlations between Gini- and MLD-based inequality of oppor-
tunity measures, 2005.
Direct Indirect
yc1 yc2 yc3 yc4 yc5 yEO1 yEO2 yEO3 yEO4 yEO5
0.976 0.975 0.974 0.982 0.964 0.809 0.755 0.693 0.963 0.774
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Rank correlations are shown in the upper row, while p-values are shown in the
lower row.
Table 6: Rank correlations between inequality of opportunity measures. Gini
coefficient, 2011.
Direct measures Indirect Measures
EA EP EA
yc1 yc2 yc3 yc4 yc5 yEO1 yEO2 yEO3 yEO4
yc2 0.770
0.000
yc3 0.181 0.425
0.348 0.022
yc4 0.225 0.345 0.235
0.241 0.068 0.220
yc5 0.211 0.489 0.965 0.253
0.271 0.007 0.000 0.186
yEO1 -0.018 0.138 -0.011 0.875 0.020
0.925 0.476 0.954 0.000 0.917
yEO2 -0.025 0.117 0.030 0.899 0.045 0.793
0.790 0.547 0.881 0.000 0.815 0.000
yEO3 0.028 0.118 0.036 0.900 0.062 0.971 0.992
0.885 0.541 0.853 0.000 0.749 0.000 0.000
yEO4 0.733 0.741 0.518 0.126 0.572 -0.123 -0.123 -0.094
0.000 0.000 0.004 0.515 0.001 0.525 0.526 0.627
yEO5 -0.003 0.085 -0.009 0.892 0.011 0.970 0.992 0.985 -0.147
0.990 0.662 0.964 0.000 0.954 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.446
Notes: Rank correlations are shown in the upper row, while p-values are shown in the
lower row. EA means Ex-ante, EP means Ex-post.
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Table 7: Rank correlations between inequality of opportunity measures. Mean
Log Deviation, 2011.
Direct measures Indirect Measures
EA EP EA
yc1 yc2 yc3 yc4 yc5 yEO1 yEO2 yEO3 yEO4
yc2 0.850
0.000
yc3 0.503 0.667
0.005 0.000
yc4 0.358 0.336 0.245
0.057 0.075 0.201
yc5 0.549 0.713 0.965 0.262
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.170
yEO1 0.358 0.336 0.245 1.000 0.262
0.057 0.075 0.201 0.000 0.170
yEO2 0.344 0.322 0.234 0.999 0.251 0.999
0.068 0.088 0.223 0.000 0.189 0.000
yEO3 0.344 0.322 0.234 1.000 0.251 1.000 0.999
0.068 0.089 0.223 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.000
yEO4 1.000 0.849 0.503 0.358 0.549 0.358 0.343 0.344
0.000 0.000 0.005 0.057 0.002 0.057 0.067 0.068
yEO5 0.358 0.336 0.245 1.000 0.262 1.000 0.995 1.000 0.358
0.057 0.075 0.201 0.000 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.057
Notes: Rank correlations are shown in the upper row, while p-values are shown in
the lower row. EA means Ex-ante, EP means Ex-post.
Table 8: Rank correlations between Gini- and MLD-based inequality of oppor-
tunity measures, 2011.
Direct Indirect
yc1 yc2 yc3 yc4 yc5 yEO1 yEO2 yEO3 yEO4 yEO5
0.781 0.817 0.981 0.980 0.982 0.873 0.887 0.886 0.928 0.865
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Rank correlations are shown in the upper row, while p-values are shown in the
lower row.
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Table 9: Growth regressions. Fixed effect estimates of Outcome, Opportunity and Effort Inequality. Inequality measured with the
Mean Log Deviation.
Period Inequality Direct Approach
y yc1 yc2 yc3 yc4 yc5
β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value β p-value
(t, t-1) Outcome -0.180 0.393
Opportunity -0.351 0.739 0.372 0.764 0.358 0.788 -0.209 0.412 -5.892 0.376
Effort -0.157 0.541 -0.237 0.346 -0.234 0.358 -0.117 0.744 -0.103 0.653
(t, t-2) Outcome -0.203 0.298
Opportunity -0.610 0.529 0.072 0.950 0.207 0.866 -0.233 0.324 -4.376 0.478
Effort -0.149 0.527 -0.231 0.320 -0.244 0.300 -0.139 0.673 -0.147 0.492
(t, t-3) Outcome -0.243 0.216
Opportunity -0.552 0.569 0.178 0.876 0.202 0.869 -0.240 0.310 -1.663 0.788
Effort -0.202 0.394 -0.286 0.221 -0.288 0.224 -0.250 0.452 -0.224 0.305
Indirect Approach
yEO1 yEO2 yEO3 yEO4 yEO5
(t, t-1) Opportunity -0.209 0.412 -0.204 0.431 -0.197 0.456 -0.351 0.739 -0.160 0.549
Effort -0.117 0.744 -0.132 0.708 -0.148 0.679 -0.157 0.541 -0.222 0.578
(t, t-2) Opportunity -0.233 0.324 -0.237 0.323 -0.228 0.351 -0.610 0.529 -0.203 0.413
Effort -0.139 0.673 -0.136 0.675 -0.156 0.636 -0.149 0.527 -0.204 0.579
(t, t-3) Opportunity -0.240 0.310 -0.252 0.294 -0.249 0.309 -0.552 0.569 -0.224 0.367
Effort -0.250 0.452 -0.225 0.490 -0.231 0.484 -0.202 0.394 -0.285 0.439
N 49 49 49 49 49 49
Notes: All regressions include GDP, population share with upper-secondary school or above, and ratio of business investment to GDP, all measured
at the beginning of the period, plus a time dummy. * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<0.05.
20
Table 10: Summary Statistics of Circumstance Variables, 2005
Parental Education Parental Occupation
Country >Secondary Skilled Unskilled Male Foreign Parents at home
BE Belgium 0.19 0.41 0.21 0.49 0.08 0.89
0.39 0.49 0.40 0.50 0.26 0.32
DK Denmark 0.22 0.45 0.20 0.49 0.04 0.84
0.41 0.50 0.40 0.50 0.19 0.37
DE Germany 0.34 0.45 0.18 0.44 0.05 0.85
0.47 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.23 0.36
GR Greece 0.08 0.67 0.15 0.49 0.06 0.95
0.27 0.47 0.36 0.50 0.24 0.22
ES Spain 0.09 0.53 0.30 0.48 0.05 0.91
0.29 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.21 0.29
FR France 0.10 0.43 0.29 0.48 0.09 0.84
0.30 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.29 0.37
IE Ireland 0.13 0.27 0.29 0.47 0.03 0.92
0.34 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.17 0.27
IT Italy 0.03 0.49 0.28 0.49 0.04 0.92
0.18 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.20 0.27
LU Luxembourg 0.18 0.40 0.28 0.49 0.09 0.90
0.39 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.28 0.31
NL Netherlands 0.17 0.34 0.17 0.49 0.05 0.90
0.37 0.48 0.37 0.50 0.21 0.30
AT Austria 0.06 0.56 0.22 0.49 0.09 0.85
0.24 0.50 0.42 0.50 0.29 0.36
PT Portugal 0.04 0.63 0.24 0.48 0.01 0.85
0.19 0.48 0.43 0.50 0.11 0.36
FI Finland 0.15 0.57 0.20 0.50 0.02 0.85
0.36 0.50 0.40 0.50 0.12 0.35
SE Sweden 0.21 0.49 0.18 0.49 0.08 0.83
0.41 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.28 0.38
UK United Kingdom 0.33 0.36 0.31 0.48 0.10 0.84
0.47 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.31 0.37
CY Cyprus 0.07 0.57 0.31 0.47 0.09 0.91
0.26 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.29 0.29
CZ Czech Rep. 0.09 0.50 0.28 0.48 0.01 0.86
0.29 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.10 0.35
EE Estonia 0.25 0.38 0.39 0.46 0.15 0.76
0.43 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.36 0.43
HU Hungary 0.13 0.52 0.30 0.48 0.02 0.84
0.34 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.14 0.37
LV Latvia 0.19 0.34 0.44 0.45 0.16 0.70
0.39 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.37 0.46
LT Lithuania 0.24 0.38 0.45 0.45 0.06 0.80
0.42 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.40
PL Poland 0.06 0.64 0.22 0.48 0.00 0.89
0.25 0.48 0.41 0.50 0.05 0.32
SK Slovak Rep. 0.09 0.37 0.41 0.47 0.00 0.91
0.29 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.06 0.29
SI Slovenia 0.08 0.47 0.36 0.50 0.11 0.84
0.28 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.32 0.37
IS Iceland 0.23 0.52 0.13 0.50 0.02 0.84
0.42 0.50 0.34 0.50 0.15 0.37
NO Norway 0.41 0.48 0.18 0.49 0.05 0.91
0.49 0.50 0.39 0.50 0.22 0.29
Total 0.14 0.49 0.27 0.48 0.05 0.87
0.34 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.23 0.33
Notes: Statistics for each country follow this order: Mean values, standard deviation. All variables are dummies.
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Table 11: Summary Statistics of Circumstance Variables, 2011
Parental Education Parental Occupation
Country >Secondary Skilled Unskilled Male Foreign Parents at home
BE Belgium 0.16 0.72 0.07 0.48 0.11 0.85
0.36 0.45 0.26 0.50 0.31 0.36
DK Denmark 0.23 0.41 0.15 0.49 0.10 0.87
0.42 0.49 0.35 0.50 0.30 0.34
DE Germany 0.12 0.53 0.27 0.50 0.00 0.91
0.33 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.07 0.29
EL Greece 0.17 0.49 0.10 0.47 0.11 0.85
0.38 0.50 0.30 0.50 0.31 0.36
ES Spain 0.09 0.63 0.18 0.45 0.12 0.91
0.29 0.48 0.38 0.50 0.32 0.29
FR France 0.10 0.50 0.27 0.48 0.01 0.86
0.30 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.09 0.35
IE Ireland 0.29 0.42 0.21 0.47 0.06 0.84
0.45 0.49 0.41 0.50 0.24 0.37
IT Italy 0.26 0.59 0.08 0.48 0.05 0.83
0.44 0.49 0.26 0.50 0.21 0.37
LU Luxembourg 0.22 0.37 0.38 0.49 0.13 0.76
0.41 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.34 0.43
NL Netherlands 0.07 0.70 0.12 0.49 0.08 0.93
0.26 0.46 0.32 0.50 0.27 0.25
AT Austria 0.09 0.57 0.15 0.49 0.07 0.90
0.29 0.50 0.36 0.50 0.26 0.30
PT Portugal 0.23 0.50 0.19 0.50 0.02 0.84
0.42 0.50 0.40 0.50 0.16 0.37
FI Finland 0.13 0.50 0.07 0.48 0.07 0.83
0.34 0.50 0.26 0.50 0.26 0.37
SE Sweden 0.07 0.58 0.16 0.48 0.11 0.88
0.25 0.49 0.37 0.50 0.31 0.32
UK United Kingdom 0.10 0.52 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.85
0.30 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.06 0.36
BG Bulgaria 0.17 0.53 0.09 0.48 0.07 0.89
0.37 0.50 0.28 0.50 0.25 0.31
CY Cyprus 0.17 0.59 0.11 0.49 0.04 0.90
0.37 0.49 0.31 0.50 0.19 0.30
CZ Czech Rep. 0.05 0.55 0.15 0.48 0.06 0.90
0.21 0.50 0.36 0.50 0.23 0.29
EE Estonia 0.13 0.53 0.23 0.46 0.06 0.85
0.33 0.50 0.42 0.50 0.24 0.35
HU Hungary 0.14 0.44 0.22 0.49 0.10 0.87
0.35 0.50 0.41 0.50 0.30 0.33
LV Latvia 0.17 0.47 0.27 0.45 0.14 0.77
0.37 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.34 0.42
LT Lithuania 0.07 0.54 0.13 0.48 0.05 0.93
0.25 0.50 0.33 0.50 0.23 0.26
MT Malta 0.24 0.46 0.09 0.48 0.05 0.89
0.43 0.50 0.28 0.50 0.22 0.31
PL Poland 0.34 0.49 0.12 0.50 0.05 0.92
0.47 0.50 0.32 0.50 0.22 0.27
RO Romania 0.08 0.69 0.16 0.48 0.00 0.89
0.27 0.46 0.36 0.50 0.03 0.31
SK Slovak Rep. 0.04 0.68 0.15 0.47 0.06 0.87
0.20 0.47 0.36 0.50 0.24 0.34
IS Iceland 0.24 0.54 0.13 0.48 0.12 0.81
0.43 0.50 0.34 0.50 0.32 0.39
CH Switzerland 0.09 0.48 0.28 0.47 0.00 0.92
0.28 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.05 0.27
HR Croatia 0.21 0.44 0.18 0.47 0.09 0.83
0.40 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.29 0.38
Total 0.13 0.54 0.18 0.48 0.06 0.87
0.34 0.50 0.39 0.50 0.24 0.34
Notes: Statistics for each country follow this order: Mean values, standard deviation. All variables are dummies.
22
Table 12: Summary Statistics of Effort Variables, 2005
Own Education Own Occupation
Country >Secondary Skilled Unskilled Married Working
BE Belgium 0.39 0.24 0.19 0.69 0.69
0.49 0.43 0.39 0.46 0.46
DK Denmark 0.34 0.25 0.15 0.73 0.88
0.47 0.43 0.35 0.44 0.33
DE Germany 0.48 0.22 0.11 0.72 0.71
0.50 0.41 0.31 0.45 0.45
GR Greece 0.25 0.43 0.15 0.78 0.70
0.43 0.50 0.36 0.41 0.46
ES Spain 0.27 0.37 0.26 0.75 0.68
0.45 0.48 0.44 0.43 0.47
FR France 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.67 0.77
0.44 0.44 0.41 0.47 0.42
IE Ireland 0.37 0.26 0.22 0.70 0.69
0.48 0.44 0.41 0.46 0.46
IT Italy 0.18 0.31 0.20 0.71 0.66
0.38 0.46 0.40 0.45 0.47
LU Luxembourg 0.30 0.25 0.18 0.68 0.71
0.46 0.43 0.38 0.47 0.45
NL Netherlands 0.36 0.21 0.11 0.75 0.73
0.48 0.41 0.31 0.44 0.44
AT Austria 0.29 0.39 0.17 0.73 0.76
0.45 0.49 0.38 0.44 0.43
PT Portugal 0.11 0.44 0.24 0.79 0.74
0.32 0.50 0.43 0.41 0.44
FI Finland 0.37 0.35 0.12 0.71 0.81
0.48 0.48 0.33 0.46 0.39
SE Sweden 0.39 0.30 0.14 0.61 0.85
0.49 0.46 0.34 0.49 0.35
UK United Kingdom 0.41 0.25 0.19 0.65 0.78
0.49 0.43 0.39 0.48 0.42
CY Cyprus 0.29 0.35 0.24 0.85 0.77
0.45 0.48 0.43 0.36 0.42
CZ Czech Rep. 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.73 0.77
0.36 0.48 0.39 0.45 0.42
EE Estonia 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.64 0.79
0.49 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.41
HU Hungary 0.15 0.38 0.24 0.65 0.72
0.35 0.49 0.42 0.48 0.45
LV Latvia 0.32 0.34 0.30 0.57 0.77
0.47 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.42
LT Lithuania 0.56 0.39 0.25 0.78 0.77
0.50 0.49 0.43 0.42 0.42
PL Poland 0.17 0.46 0.21 0.80 0.60
0.37 0.50 0.41 0.40 0.49
SK Slovak Rep. 0.17 0.31 0.23 0.81 0.77
0.38 0.46 0.42 0.39 0.42
SI Slovenia 0.18 0.28 0.26 0.69 0.75
0.38 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.44
IS Iceland 0.35 0.33 0.10 0.68 0.89
0.48 0.47 0.30 0.47 0.31
NO Norway 0.38 0.30 0.10 0.67 0.84
0.49 0.46 0.30 0.47 0.37
Total 0.29 0.32 0.19 0.72 0.73
0.45 0.47 0.39 0.45 0.44
Notes: Statistics for each country follow this order: Mean values, standard deviation. All
variables are dummies.
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Table 13: Summary Statistics of Effort Variables, 2011
Own Education Own Occupation
Country >Secondary Skilled Unskilled Married Working
BE Belgium 0.33 0.30 0.19 0.62 0.76
0.47 0.46 0.39 0.49 0.43
DK Denmark 0.44 0.23 0.17 0.61 0.75
0.50 0.42 0.38 0.49 0.43
DE Germany 0.23 0.41 0.27 0.69 0.74
0.42 0.49 0.44 0.46 0.44
EL Greece 0.39 0.25 0.11 0.69 0.82
0.49 0.43 0.31 0.46 0.38
ES Spain 0.33 0.32 0.25 0.83 0.78
0.47 0.47 0.43 0.38 0.42
FR France 0.16 0.33 0.21 0.68 0.78
0.37 0.47 0.41 0.47 0.41
IE Ireland 0.46 0.20 0.18 0.66 0.78
0.50 0.40 0.38 0.47 0.41
IT Italy 0.40 0.15 0.12 0.75 0.87
0.49 0.36 0.32 0.43 0.33
LU Luxembourg 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.57 0.74
0.47 0.46 0.45 0.50 0.44
NL Netherlands 0.30 0.41 0.16 0.76 0.62
0.46 0.49 0.37 0.43 0.49
AT Austria 0.33 0.32 0.27 0.70 0.66
0.47 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.47
PT Portugal 0.43 0.37 0.13 0.67 0.80
0.50 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.40
FI Finland 0.32 0.26 0.21 0.60 0.79
0.47 0.44 0.40 0.49 0.41
SE Sweden 0.15 0.42 0.21 0.74 0.55
0.35 0.49 0.41 0.44 0.50
UK United Kingdom 0.25 0.33 0.29 0.63 0.67
0.43 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.47
BG Bulgaria 0.51 0.30 0.23 0.66 0.61
0.50 0.46 0.42 0.47 0.49
CY Cyprus 0.45 0.32 0.10 0.66 0.83
0.50 0.47 0.30 0.47 0.37
CZ Czech Rep. 0.20 0.29 0.19 0.67 0.70
0.40 0.45 0.39 0.47 0.46
EE Estonia 0.61 0.36 0.24 0.75 0.73
0.49 0.48 0.43 0.43 0.44
HU Hungary 0.29 0.26 0.21 0.71 0.74
0.45 0.44 0.41 0.46 0.44
LV Latvia 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.53 0.70
0.48 0.46 0.44 0.50 0.46
LT Lithuania 0.14 0.27 0.31 0.78 0.58
0.34 0.44 0.46 0.41 0.49
MT Malta 0.40 0.20 0.10 0.71 0.85
0.49 0.40 0.30 0.46 0.36
PL Poland 0.46 0.28 0.09 0.65 0.88
0.50 0.45 0.29 0.48 0.32
RO Romania 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.78 0.71
0.43 0.50 0.40 0.41 0.45
SK Slovak Rep. 0.15 0.41 0.26 0.72 0.71
0.36 0.49 0.44 0.45 0.45
IS Iceland 0.44 0.30 0.13 0.61 0.89
0.50 0.46 0.34 0.49 0.31
CH Switzerland 0.23 0.32 0.19 0.72 0.79
0.42 0.47 0.40 0.45 0.41
HR Croatia 0.39 0.24 0.18 0.65 0.79
0.49 0.43 0.38 0.48 0.41
Total 0.32 0.31 0.21 0.68 0.74
0.46 0.46 0.40 0.47 0.44
Notes: Statistics for each country follow this order: Mean values, standard deviation. All
variables are dummies.
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